P37: The good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men; and this Desire is greater as his knowledge of God/Nature is greater.
Dem.: Insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, they are most useful to man (by P35 C1); hence (by P19), according to the guidance of reason, we necessarily strive to bring it about that men live according to the guidance of reason. Now, the good which everyone who lives according to the dictate of reason (i.e., by P24, who seeks virtue) wants for himself is understanding (by P26). Therefore, the good which everyone who seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men.
Next, Desire, insofar as it is related to the Mind, is the very essence of the Mind (by Def. Aff. I). Now the essence of the Mind consists in knowledge (by IIP11), which involves knowledge of God/Nature (by IIP47). Without this {knowledge the Mind} can neither be nor be conceived (by IP15). Hence, as the Mind’s essence involves a greater knowledge of God/Nature, so will the Desire also be greater by which one who seeks virtue desires for another the good he wants for himself, q.e.d.
Alternative dem.: The good which man wants for himself and loves, he will love more constantly if he sees that others love it (by IIIP31). So (by IIIP31 C), he will strive to have the others love the same thing. And because this good is common to all (by P36), and all can enjoy it, he will therefore (by the same reason) strive that all may enjoy it. And this striving will be the greater, the more he enjoys this good (by IIIP37), q.e.d.
Schol. 1: He who strives, only because of an affect, that others should love what he loves, and live according to his temperament, acts only from impulse and is hateful—especially to those to whom other things are pleasing, and who also, therefore, strive eagerly, from the same impulse, to have other men live according to their own temperament. And since the greatest good men seek from an affect is often such that only one can possess it fully, those who love are not of one mind in their love—while they rejoice to sing the praises of the thing they love, they fear to be believed. But he who strives from reason to guide others acts not by impulse, but kindly, generously, and with the greatest steadfastness of mind.
Again, whatever we desire and do of which we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of God/Nature, or insofar as we know God/Nature, I relate to Religion. The Desire to do good generated in us by our living according to the guidance of reason, I call Morality.
The Desire by which a man who lives according to the guidance of reason is bound to join others to himself in friendship, I call Being Honorable, and I call that honorable which men who live according to the guidance of reason praise; on the other hand, what is contrary to the formation of friendship, I call dishonorable.
In addition to this, I have also shown what the foundations of the state are. Furthermore, from what has been said above, one can easily perceive the difference between true virtue and lack of power; true virtue is nothing but living according to the guidance of reason, and so lack of power consists only in this, that a man allows himself to be guided by things outside him, and to be determined by them to do what the common constitution of external things demands, not what his own nature, considered in itself, demands.
These are the things I promised, in P18 S, to demonstrate. From them it is clear that the law against killing animals is based more on empty superstition and unmanly compassion than sound reason. The rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us the necessity of joining with men, but not with the lower animals, or with things whose nature is different from human nature. We have the same right against them that they have against us.
Indeed, because the right of each one is defined by his virtue, or power, men have a far greater right against the lower animals than they have against men. Not that I deny that the lower animals have sensations. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us.
For they do not agree in nature with us, and their affects are different in nature from human affects (see IIIP57 S).
It remains now for me to explain what is just and what unjust, what sin is, and finally, what merit is. These matters will be taken up in the following scholium.
Schol. 2: In the Appendix of Part I, I promised to explain what praise and blame, merit and sin, and justice and injus tice are. As far as praise and blame are concerned, I have explained them in IIIP29 S. This will be the place to speak of the others. But first a few words must be said about man’s natural state and his civil state.
Everyone exists by the highest right of nature, and consequently everyone, by the highest right of nature, does those things that follow from the necessity of his own nature. So everyone, by the highest right of nature, judges what is good and what is evil, considers his own advantage according to his own temperament (see P19 and P20), avenges himself (see IIIP40 C2), and strives to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates (see IIIP28).
If men lived according to the guidance of reason, everyone would possess this right of his (by P35 C1) without any injury to anyone else. But because they are subject to the affects (by P4 C), which far surpass man’s power, or virtue (by P6), they are often drawn in different directions (by P33) and are contrary to one another (by P34), while they require one another’s aid (by P35 S).
In order, therefore, that men may be able to live harmoniously and be of assistance to one another, it is necessary for them to give up their natural right and to make one another confident that they will do nothing which could harm others. How it can happen that men who are necessarily subject to affects (by P4 C), inconstant and changeable (by P33) should be able to make one another confident and have trust in one another, is clear from P7 and IIIP39.
No affect can be restrained except by an affect stronger than and contrary to the affect to be restrained, and everyone refrains from doing harm out of timidity regarding a greater harm.
By this law, therefore, Society can be maintained, provided it appropriates to itself the right everyone has of avenging himself, and of judging concerning good and evil. In this way Society has the power to prescribe a common rule of life, to make laws, and to maintain them—not by reason, which cannot restrain the affects (by P17 S), but by threats. This Society, maintained by laws and the power it has of preserving itself, is called a State, and those who are defended by its law, Citizens.
From this we easily understand that there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil; for everyone who is in the state of nature considers only his own advantage, and decides what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. He is not bound by any law to submit to anyone except himself. So in the state of nature no sin can be conceived.
But in the Civil state, of course, it is decided by common agreement what is good or what is evil. And everyone is bound to submit to the State. Sin, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, which for that reason can be punished only by the law of the State. On the other hand, obedience is considered a merit in a Citizen, because on that account he is judged worthy of enjoying the advantages of the State.
Again, in the state of nature there is no one who by common consent is Master of anything, nor is there anything in Nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s.
Instead, all things belong to all. So in the state of nature, there cannot be conceived any will to give to each his own, or to take away from someone what is his. I.e., in the state of nature nothing is done which can be called just or unjust.
But in the civil state, of course, where it is decided by common consent what belongs to this man, and what to that, things are done which can be called just or unjust.
From this it is clear that just and unjust, sin and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explain the nature of the Mind. But enough of this.