P25: God/Nature is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Dem.: If you deny this, then God/Nature is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by A4) the essence of things can be conceived without God/Nature. But (by P15) this is absurd. Therefore God/Nature is also the cause of the essence of things, q.e.d.

Schol.: This Proposition follows more clearly from P16. For from that it follows that from the given Divine/Universal nature both the essence of things and their existence must necessarily be inferred; and in a word, God/Nature must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself. This will be established still more clearly from the following corollary.

Cor.: Particular things are nothing but affections of God/Nature’s attributes, or modes by which God/Nature’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way. The demonstration is evident from P15 and D5.