P17: God/Nature acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.

Dem.: We have just shown (P16) that from the necessity of the Divine/Universal nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow, and in P15 we have demonstrated that nothing can be or be conceived without God/Nature, but that all things are in God/Nature. So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act. Therefore, God/Nature acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God/Nature to action, except the perfection of his nature.

Cor. 2: It follows, secondly, that God/Nature alone is a free cause. For God/Nature alone exists only from the necessity of his nature (by P11 and P14C1), and acts from the necessity of his nature (by P17). Therefore (by D7) God/Nature alone is a free cause, q.e.d.

Schol.: [I.] Others think that God/Nature is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring it about that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e., which are in his power) do not happen or are not produced by him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God/Nature can bring it about that it would not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause the effect would not follow—which is absurd.

Further, I shall show later, without the aid of this Proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to God/Nature’s nature. Of course I know there are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free will pertain to God/Nature’s nature. For they say they know nothing they can ascribe to God/Nature more perfect than what is the highest perfection in us.

Moreover, even if they conceive God/Nature to actually understand in the highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring it about that all the things he actually understands exist. For they think that in that way they would destroy God/Nature’s power. If he had created all the things in his intellect (they say), then he would have been able to create nothing more, which they believe to be incompatible with God/Nature’s omnipotence. So they preferred to maintain that God/Nature is indifferent to all things, not creating anything except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will.

But I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God/Nature’s supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God/Nature’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, at least in my opinion, God/Nature’s omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly.

Indeed—to speak openly—my opponents seem to deny God/Nature’s omnipotence. For they are forced to confess that God/Nature understands infinitely many creatable things, which nevertheless he will never be able to create. For otherwise, if he created everything he understood {to be creatable} he would (according to them) exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. Therefore to maintain that God/Nature is perfect, they are driven to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not see what could be feigned which would be more absurd than this or more contrary to God/Nature’s omnipotence.

[II.] Further—to say something here also about the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God/Nature—if will and intellect do pertain to the eternal essence of God/Nature, we must of course understand by each of these attributes something different from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will which would constitute God/Nature’s essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could not agree with them in anything except the name. They would not agree with one another any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal. I shall demonstrate this.

If intellect pertains to the Divine/Universal nature, it will not be able to be (like our intellect) by nature either posterior to (as most would have it), or simultaneous with, the things understood, since God/Nature is prior in causality to all things (by P16 C1). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists objectively in that way in God/Nature’s intellect. So God/Nature’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God/Nature’s essence, is really the cause both of the essence and of the existence of things. This seems also to have been noticed by those who asserted that God/Nature’s intellect, will and power are one and the same.

Therefore, since God/Nature’s intellect is the only cause of things (viz. as we have shown, both of their essence and of their existence), he must necessarily differ from them both as to his essence and as to his existence. For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause {for that reason it is called the effect of such a cause}. E.g., a man is the cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, they can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existing they must differ. And for that reason, if the existence of one perishes, the other’s existence will not thereby perish. But if the essence of one could be destroyed, and become false, the other’s essence would also be destroyed {and become false}.

So the thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect, must differ from such an effect, both as to its essence and as to its existence. But God/Nature’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore, God/Nature’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the Divine/Universal essence, differs from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in anything except in name, as we supposed. The proof proceeds in the same way concerning the will, as anyone can easily see.