P33: Things could have been produced by God/Nature in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.

Dem.: For all things have necessarily followed from God/Nature’s given nature (by P16), and have been determined from the necessity of God/Nature’s nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by P29). Therefore, if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different, then God/Nature’s nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore (by P11) that {other nature} would also have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd (by P14 C1). So things could have been produced in no other way and no other order, etc., q.e.d.

Schol. 1: Since by these propositions I have shown more clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain briefly what we must understand by contingent—but first, what {we must understand} by necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing’s existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. And a thing is also called impossible from these same causes—viz. either because its essence, or definition, involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause which has been determined to produce such a thing.

But a thing is called contingent only because of a defect of our knowledge. For if we do not know that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction, or if we do know very well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, and nevertheless can affirm nothing certainly about its existence, because the order of causes is hidden from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or impossible. So we call it contingent or possible.

Schol. 2: From the preceding it clearly follows that things have been produced by God/Nature with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God/Nature of any imperfection, for his perfection compels us to affirm this. Indeed, from the opposite, it would clearly follow (as I have just shown), that God/Nature is not supremely perfect; because if things had been produced by God/Nature in another way, we would have to attribute to God/Nature another nature, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect Being.

Of course, I have no doubt that many will reject this opinion as absurd, without even being willing to examine it—for no other reason than because they have been accustomed to attribute another freedom to God/Nature, far different from that we have taught (D7), viz. an absolute will. But I also have no doubt that, if they are willing to reflect on the matter, and consider properly the chain of our demonstrations, in the end they will utterly reject the freedom they now attribute to God/Nature, not only as futile, but as a great obstacle to science. Nor is it necessary for me to repeat here what I said in P17 S.

Nevertheless, to please them, I shall show that even if it is conceded that will pertains to God/Nature’s essence, it still follows from his perfection that things could have been created by God/Nature in no other way or order. It will be easy to show this if we consider, first, what they themselves concede, viz. that it depends on God/Nature’s decree and will alone that each thing is what it is. For otherwise God/Nature would not be the cause of all things. Next, that all God/Nature’s decrees have been established by God/Nature himself from eternity. For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since, in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after, it follows, from God/Nature’s perfection alone, that he can never decree anything different, and never could have, or that God/Nature was not before his decrees, and cannot be without them.

But they will say that even if it were supposed that God/Nature had made another nature of things, or that from eternity he had decreed something else concerning nature and its order, no imperfection in God/Nature would follow from that.

Still, if they say this, they will concede at the same time that God/Nature can change his decrees. For if God/Nature had decreed, concerning nature and its order, something other than what he did decree, i.e., had willed and conceived something else concerning nature, he would necessarily have had an intellect other than he now has, and a will other than he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute to God/Nature another intellect and another will, without any change of his essence and of his perfection, why can he not now change his decrees concerning created things, and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For his intellect and will concerning created things and their order are the same in respect to his essence and his perfection, however his will and intellect may be conceived.

Further, all the Philosophers I have seen concede that in God/Nature there is no potential intellect, but only an actual one. But since his intellect and his will are not distinguished from his essence, as they all also concede, it follows that if God/Nature had had another actual intellect, and another will, his essence would also necessarily be other. And therefore (as I inferred at the beginning) if things had been produced by God/Nature otherwise than they now are, God/Nature’s intellect and his will, i.e. (as is conceded), his essence, would have to be different {from what it now is}. And this is absurd.

Therefore, since things could have been produced by God/Nature in no other way, and no other order, and since it follows from God/Nature’s supreme perfection that this is true, no truly sound reason can persuade us to believe that God/Nature did not will to create all the things that are in his intellect, with that same perfection with which he understands them.

But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things; what is in them, on account of which they are perfect or imperfect, and are called good or bad, depends only on God/Nature’s will. And so, if God/Nature had willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would have been the greatest imperfection, and conversely {that what is now an imperfection in things would have been the most perfect}. How would this be different from saying openly that God/Nature, who necessarily understands what he wills, can bring it about by his will that he understands things in another way than he does understand them? As I have just shown, this is a great absurdity.

So I can turn the argument against them in the following way. All things depend on God/Nature’s power. So in order for things to be able to be different, God/Nature’s will would necessarily also have to be different. But God/Nature’s will cannot be different (as we have just shown most evidently from God/Nature’s perfection). So things also cannot be different.

I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God/Nature, and makes all things depend on his good pleasure, is nearer the truth than that of those who maintain that God/Nature does all things for the sake of the good. For they seem to place something outside God/Nature, which does not depend on God/Nature, to which God/Nature attends, as a model, in what he does, and at which he aims, as at a certain goal. This is simply to subject God/Nature to fate. Nothing more absurd can be maintained about God/Nature, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause, both of the essence of all things, and of their existence. So I shall waste no time in refuting this absurdity.