P57: The proud man loves the presence of parasites, or flatterers, but hates the presence of the noble.

Dem.: Pride is a Joy born of the fact that man thinks more highly of himself than is just (see Defs. Aff. XXVIII and VI). The proud man will strive as far as he can to encourage this opinion (see IIIP13 S). And so the proud will love the presence of parasites or flatterers (I have omitted the definitions of these because they are too well known), and will flee the presence of the noble, who think of them as is appropriate, q.e.d.

Schol.: It would take too long to enumerate all the evils of Pride here, since the proud are subject to all the affects (though they are least subject to affects of Love and Compassion).

But we ought not to pass over in silence here the fact that he also is called proud who thinks less highly of others than is just. So in this sense Pride should be defined as a Joy born of a man’s false opinion that he is above others. And the Despondency contrary to this Pride would need to be defined as a Sadness born of a man’s false opinion that he is below others.

But this being posited, we easily conceive that the proud man must be envious (see IIIP55 S) and hate those most who are most praised for their virtues, that his Hatred of them is not easily conquered by Love or benefits (see IIIP41 S), and that he takes pleasure only in the presence of those who humor his weakness of mind and make a madman of a fool.

Although Despondency is contrary to Pride, the despondent man is still very near the proud one. For since his Sadness arises from the fact that he judges his own lack of power from the power, or virtue, of others, his Sadness will be relieved, i.e., he will rejoice, if his imagination is occupied in considering the vices of others. Hence the proverb: misery loves company.

On the other hand, the more he believes himself to be below others, the more he will be saddened. That is why no one is more prone to Envy than the despondent man is, and why they strive especially to observe men’s deeds, more for the sake of finding fault than to improve them, and why, finally, they praise only Despondency, and exult over it—but in such a way that they still seem despondent.

These things follow from this affect as necessarily as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these, and like affects, evil insofar as I attend only to human advantage. But the laws of nature concern the common order of nature, of which man is a part. I wished to remind my readers of this here, in passing, in case anyone thought my purpose was only to tell about men’s vices and their absurd deeds, and not to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. For as I said in the Preface of Part III, I consider men’s affects and properties just like other natural things.

And of course human affects, if they do not indicate man’s power, at least indicate the power and skill of nature, no less than many other things we wonder at and take pleasure in contemplating. But I continue to note, concerning the affects, those things that bring advantage to men, and those that bring them harm.