P51: Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object.

Dem.: The human Body (by II Post. 3) is affected in a great many ways by external bodies. Therefore, two men can be differently affected at the same time, and so (by IIA1” ) they can be affected differently by one and the same object.

Next (by the same Post.) the human Body can be affected now in this way, now in another. Consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object, q.e.d.

Schol.: We see, then, that it can happen that what the one loves, the other hates, what the one fears, the other does not, and that one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dare what before he was too timid for.

Next, because each one judges from his own affect what is good and what is bad, what is better and what worse (see P39 S) it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as in affect. The result is that when we compare one with another, we distinguish them only by a difference of affects, and call some intrepid, others timid, and others, finally, by another name.

For example, I shall call him intrepid who disdains an evil I usually fear. Moreover, if I attend to the fact that his desire to do evil to one he hates, and good to one he loves, is not restrained by timidity regarding an evil by which I am usually restrained, I shall call him daring.

Someone will seem timid to me if he is afraid of an evil I usually disdain. If, moreover, I attend to the fact that his Desire {to do evil to those he hates and good to those he loves} is restrained by timidity regarding an evil which cannot restrain me, I shall call him cowardly. In this way will everyone judge.

Finally, because of this inconstancy of man’s nature and judgment, and also because he often judges things only from an affect, because the things which he believes will make for Joy or Sadness, and which he therefore strives to promote or prevent (by P28), are often only imaginary—not to mention the other conclusions we have reached in Part II about the uncertainty of things—we easily conceive that a man can often be the cause both of his own Sadness and his own Joy, or that he is affected both with Joy and with Sadness, accompanied by the idea of himself as their cause. So we easily understand what Repentance and Self-esteem are: Repentance is Sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and Self-esteem is Joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause. Because men believe themselves free, these affects are very violent (see P49).